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October 21, 1970

Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Esqs.
Suite 520 - Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Stevens v. Colorado
Fuel & Iron
469 P*2d 3

Dear Sirs:

We have noted with i n t e r e s t the decision i n the above case,
and we wish t o consider the following papers for inclusion
i n e i t h e r BENDERfS FORMS OF DISCOVERY or BENDER'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE FORMS: Copy of the i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s by or t o
e i t h e r of the p a r t i e s , answers made t h e r e t o , and such
other discovery motions and papers as you f e e l may be of
interest.
We would appreciate your sending us a copy of t h i s m a t e r i a l .
In the event of publication, names of p a r t i e s and other i d e n t i fying personal references would be deleted, and the cooperation
of attorneys i s customarily acknowledged in a footnote. I f
you wish, your forms w i l l be returned t o you promptly.
Sincerely,

Irwin Hall
Managing Editor
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
Case No. 10085
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL
UNION NO. 5236, for and on behalf of its members employed by Columbia-Geneva Division,
United States Steel Corporation, a corporation,
Appellant,
vs.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW and
COLUMBIA-GENEVA DIVISION OF UNITED
STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a corporation,
Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a proceeding before the Department of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah
wherein unemployment benefits are sought on behalf of
15 members of appellant Union.
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DISPOSITION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
The Appeals Referee denied unemployment benefits
to each of the 15 claimants. His decision was affirmed by
the Board of Review.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the order denying unemployment benefits to the claimants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant does not attack any of the findings of fact
duly made and entered by the Senior Appeals Referee. (See
R. 41-45.) Consequently, the facts there found and stated
are controlling on this appeal. (See Title 35, Chapter 4,
Section 10(c), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) The factual
summary contained in appellant's brief is accurate and
supported by evidence in the record with the following exception: At page 6 of the brief, appellant states:
"In the instant case, employees could have accepted the cut back grade and would have continued
in employment. However, an exact number of other
employees with less seniority rights would have
been laid off." (Emphasis added.)
No record citation purporting to support such statement is made as required by Rule 75 (p) (2) (2) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. Furthermore,
the record contains no admissible evidence which would
support such a statement of fact. The only "evidence" at
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all is the conclusion of witness Williams that if he had
worked someone else would be "bumped" and that the state
"would have to pay benefits to one man, one way or another".
On the contrary, Mr. Jones testified that at the time
of the reduction in force here involved there was an unconfirmed rumor in the mill which all of the employees
had heard that a third shift was contemplated. This rumor
materialized in fact on October 27, 1963, just nine days
after the reduction in force. The expansion of the work
force from a two to a three shift operation obviously required an expansion of the work force (R. 69-70).
It also should be noted that this statement of alleged
fact by appellant carries with it an inference that such
employees hypothetically reduced would have been entitled
to workmen's compensation. This inference appears to be
the real peg upon which appellant seeks to hang this appeal. Even assuming for purpose of argument that "an
exact number" of other employees would have been "laid
off", it certainly does not follow that each of them would
have been entitled to unemployment compensation. The
record contains no evidence which would indicate that such
hypothetical reduction would have resulted in the payment
of unemployment compensation to anyone.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
EACH OF THE CLAIMANTS HERE INVOLVED MANIFESTLY LEFT HIS WORK
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VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE;
EACH THEREFORE WAS INELIGIBLE FOR
BENEFITS DURING THE PERIOD HERE INVOLVED.
The case at bar turns upon the provisions of Title 35,
Chapter 4, Section 5 (a), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
which provides:
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
"Voluntarily Leaving Work.
"(a) For the week in which he has left work
voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the
commission, and for not less than one or more than
the five next following weeks, as determined by the
commission according to the circumstances in each
case, provided that when such individual has had
no bona fide employment between the week in which
he voluntarily left such work without good cause
and the week in which he filed for benefits he shall
be disqualified for the week in which he filed for
benefits and for not less than one or more than the
five next following weeks." (Emphasis added.)
Each of the claimants here involved was offered work
in a lower pay classification. Each of them "could have
continued in employment with the company if they had
accepted the demotions as proposed and offered by the
company" (R. 42). Claimant Hancock admitted that he
elected to be laid off rather than to continue in his employment because (R. 116) :
"Maybe I did two or three times, but between
the SUB and unemployment I seemed to do better
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5
than staying on labor out there, when you figure
gas and everything/'
Claimant Downey stated that he refused to accept a
continuation of his employment but instead elected to be
unemployed for the reason that (R. 124) :
"Because I have got to figure that I have got
to live the best way I can and I have always seen
that I can make more money on the SUB and unemployment than I can working out there labor,
which has been—they only work four days a week."
From evidence such as this, the Senior Appeals Referee found (R. 44) :
"Judging from the reasons for voluntarily becoming unemployed as given by some of the claimants, it appears that to a considerable extent they
were motivated by the fact that they thought they
would be better off with unemployment compensation, plus company's supplemental unemployment
benefits, rather than continue at the reduced pay
rate."
The Legislature, in adopting the Unemployment Compensation Act provided in Title 35, Chapter 4, Section 2 :
"As a guide to the interpretation and application of this act, the public policy of this state is
declared to be as follows: Economic insecurity due
to unemployment is a serious menace to the health,
morals, and welfare of the people of this state. Unemployment is therefore a subject of general interest and concern which requires appropriate action
by the legislature to prevent its spread and to
lighten its burden which now so often falls with
crushing force upon the unemployed worker and
his family. The achievement of social security re-
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quires protection against this greatest hazard of
our economic life. * * *"
Applying this legislative intent to the acts of the claimants here involved, their claim for unemployment compensation is without merit. Their unemployment here resulted
from their own calculated volitional act. The legislature
judiciously sought to alleviate the "crushing force upon the
unemployed worker and his family" only when his unemployed status resulted from factors over which he himself
had no control. This court in Olf Nelson Construction Co.
V. Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951 expressly so held stating:
"As we pointed out in the Lexes case, the declared policy of the Unemployment Reserve Law, as
it was called in 1935, is to establish
'financial reserves for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their
own/ "
In Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees V. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. (2d) 262, 372
P. 2d 987, this court re-stated the original legislative policy of coming to the assistance of the claimant only where
his unemployment was "without fault on his part".
Although the precise question here involved has not
heretofore been resolved by this court, it has been treated
by the courts in a number of other jurisdictions. The rule
emerging from the cases is stated as follows at 90 A. L. R.
2d at page 846:
"A number of cases have involved the question
whether an employee who in accordance with the
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seniority provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is transferred or offered a transfer, but refuses such transfer and leaves the service of the
employer is Voluntarily' unemployed. The general
rule of these cases would appear to be that the employee offered a lower-paying job when there is no
longer work available in his regular classification
must take such a job or be considered 'voluntarily'
unemployed. It must be noted, of course, that in
these cases the Union's part in the transaction is to
protect the employee from dismissal for lack of
work, and where the employee, rather than take
advantage of this protection, chooses to take his
chances on doing better elsewhere, he has little
ground for complaint."
In Goebelbecker V. State (1958), 53 N. J. Super. 53,
146 A. 2d 488, a claimant refused to accept a demotion
from $2.77 per hour to $2.32 per hour. Because of the difference in the disqualification period under the New Jersey
statute between "work refusal" and a "voluntary quit",
the claimant there asserted that his refusal constituted a
"work refusal", not a "voluntary quit". Whether a work
refusal or a voluntary quit under the Utah statute is, of
course, immaterial inasmuch as the same disqualification
period applies to each. However, the court in the Goebelbecker case ruled that the refusal to accept demotion constituted a voluntary leaving of employment stating:
"This argument is without merit. The relationship of employer and employee was never severed
by the employer; appellant remained on the company's payroll and retained both his seniority and
the right to continue work at another job in his
family group . . . The Act was not intended to of-
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fer benefits to workers as an alternate to accommodating their employers changed operations. Ordinary common sense as well as a consideration of
the underlying purposes of unemployment compensation require us to hold that claimant left work
voluntarily rather than that he refused to accept
suitable new employment.
"The burden is on the claimant to establish a
justifiable reason or excuse for his failure to accept the Croacher position. Good cause means cause
sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks
of the unemployed."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dentici V. Industrial
Commission, 264 Wis. 181, 58 N. W. 2d 717, 720 (1953)
entered a similar ruling in a case in which a claimant refused to accept an assignment involving reduced earnings
in another department stating:
"* * * Here it must be held that there was
a voluntary termination of his employment by the
employee, because the evidence shows that by his
acts he intended to leave his employment rather
than accept a transfer."
ACCORD:
Claim of Gerdano, 2 App. Div. 2d 88, 153 N. Y. S. 2d
924 (1956) — Where employee refused to accept demotion
from job grade 7 to job grade 4 and was held thus to have
voluntarily left his employment without good cause.
Arizona, CCH Par. 8211.18 (1956) — Appeal Tribunal
ruled that refusal to accept transfer to lower paying job
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constituted voluntary quit without good cause.
Indiana, CCH Par. 1975 (.487) (1951) — Review
Board ruled that refusal to transfer to a higher paying but
less desirable job in accordance with seniority rights constituted voluntary leaving from employment.
Indiana, CCH Par. 8214.05 (1954) — The Board of
Review held that an employee who refused to accept transfer to lower paying job voluntarily left work without good
cause.
Michigan, CCH Par. 8949 (1960) — The Circuit Court,
reversing an Appeals Board award, ruled that a foreman
could not receive unemployment compensation who had
refused to work on a second shift stating:
"There is no question of fact at all. It is a question of law. If a man quits his job voluntarily, unless he can blame it on the employer he cannot get
benefits. ,,
Washington, CCH Par. 8295 (1958) — The Washington Superior Court ruled that a claimant who refused to
accept an assignment to a lower paying classification was
disqualified from receiving benefits, stating:
"* * * the C ourt concludes as a matter of
law * * * the claimant left his employment
voluntarily without good cause because * * *."
New Jersey, CCH Par. 8322.02 (1958) — A claimant
was held to have voluntarily quit by the Board of Review,
and hence to be disqualified from receiving benefits, when
he refused to exercise seniority to work in a lower paying
job instead of accepting lay off.
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New Jersey, CCH Par. 8338.10 (1959) — The Board
of Review held that an employee who exercised his right
under the labor agreement to accept lay-off, rather than
demotion, was disqualified for voluntary leaving of work
without good cause.
Vermont, CCH Par. 806011 (1952) (new matters) —
An employee who refused to accept a transfer to a lower
paying job was disqualified because of voluntarily leaving
work.
Texas, CCH Par. 8188 (1955) (new matters) — The
Employment Commission ruled that refusal to transfer to
another job at a lower rate of pay constituted voluntary
resignation without cause disqualifying for benefits.
We submit that the expressed policy of the Utah Legislature in adopting the unemployment compensation statute requires an adoption by this court of the rule stated
in the authorities set forth above and that the order of
the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
POINT II.

NO AUTHORITY IS CITED IN AID OF ANY
OF THE ARGUMENTS MADE IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF; NONE OF THE ARGUMENTS
STATED HAS MERIT.
Each of the appellant's arguments will be discussed
in sequence:
a)

That 15 other employees would have received
unemployment compensation; hence, 15 em-
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ployees here involved simply were "good Samaritans".
This argument appears to be the central core of appellant's argument. However, it is fraught with difficulties.
Aside from the bald and unsupported conclusion contained in the "good Samaritan" testimony of witness Williams as follows, the record contains no evidence whatsoever which would indicate that an equal number of employees would have been placed on lay-off status. Mr. Williams
gratuitously concluded (R. 118) :
"Some of them had some of their SUB payments still available, but I felt I was in a little better shape financially than some of those may have
been, so being a good Samaritan, I accepted to take
this cut back and let one other man stay on who
would normally have been bumped out of the mill
and out of all benefits had I stayed on. So the
State would have to pay benefits to one man, one
way or another."
It is interesting to note that on the same page of the
record (R. 118) Williams admitted that at the time he was
contacted and offered a job at a lower rate of pay, "I told
them definitely not, I was going to get out of there regardless." This latter admission is consistent with the testimony of Mr. Jones who stated (R. 72) :
"Yes. On Mr. Williams, on approaching him
he refused anything we had to offer. He turned
to me and said, 1 don't want to stay, I don't care
what you have got to offer.' "
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See also the testimony of witness Jones at record page
133 as follows:
"Boyd Williams was very indignant when we
approached him. He knew of his tentative lay off.
We approached him, I showed him the chart with
his name within the job class 7 group. It was asterisked, at the bottom it had — those with asterisks are scheduled on vacation next week. Boyd
Williams said, 'I do not want anything in the small
diameter mill/ He signed the sign off and we left
him."
Contrary to the factual assumption necessary for this
argument, the Company at the time of the lay off was contemplating changing from a two to a three shift operation
which would necessitate additional personnel. The third
shift operation commenced on October 27, nine days after
the lay off here involved (R. 69-70).
The further conclusion of the "good Samaritan" that
the State would have been required to pay benefits "one
way or another", assumes, as is admitted at page 23 of
appellant's brief, that each person hypothetically so reduced in force would have been otherwise eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. There is no justification in the record for such an assumption. Even assuming
for purposes of argument that there would have been a
lay off of an equal number of men, it does not follow that
they would have received unemployment compensation benefits. They may have secured other employment, they may
have refused other proper employment or for numerous
other reasons they may have been disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation.
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Furthermore, this argument cannot be valid for the
further reason that the unemployment compensation benefits must be administered on an individual employee basis.
Whether or not some other employee may or may not receive unemployment compensation is wholly immaterial in
determining under the statute whether a particular employee meets the statutory tests.
b)

That the agreement between the Union and
the employer permitting an employee to elect
between accepting a demotion or taking lay
off binds the Commission and requires the
payment of unemployment compensation.

This argument is patently erroneous on its face. It
is absurd to argue that private parties by their contracts
can change statutory requirements. The contract provision
here involved is highly desirable from the employees' standpoint. He frequently may prefer, as some of these employees obviously did, to attempt to obtain higher paying jobs
rather than accept demotions to lower paying jobs. This
was not an agreement, however, to permit these employees to draw unemployment benefits. It would not, in any
event, change the voluntary nature of employees' acts in
leaving available jobs, thereby disqualifying them from
unemployment benefits under the Utah Act.
This precise issue was before the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Roberts V. Industrial Commission, 2 Wis. 2d 399,
86 N. W. 2d 406. There the claimant was entitled under
the provisions of the labor agreement to accept lay-off
status rather than a demotion. In ruling that the parties
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could not by their private agreement alter the application
of the statute governing unemployment compensation benefits, the court stated:
"To hold that by private agreement a party
who refuses reasonable employment is entitled to
unemployment benefits would make his eligibility
dependent on negotiation between the employee or
his bargaining agent rather than on the statute,
administered by the Industrial Commission. Yet
that is the effect which respondent now claims for
the contract. If that is the effect of the provision
in question the contract must be declared void in
that respect. But we do not think the contract attempted any such thing or that it need be so interpreted.
"The contract provision deals with the employee's seniority status. If he is offered a job more
than two labor grades below his original one he
need not take it. The parties have agreed that quitting under such circumstances will not impair his
seniority. But for compensation purposes this is
quitting nonetheless for a cause not attributable to
the employer as we held in Dentici v. Industrial
Commission, supra."
ACCORD:
Chambers V. Owens-Ames Kimball Company, 146 Ohio
S. 559:1 67 N. E. 2d 439.
Bigger v. Unemployment
43 Del. 553, 53 A. 2d 761.

Compensation

Commission,

Department of Labor and Industry V. Unemployment
Compensation Board, Pa. Superior Court, 32 Law Week
2693 (June 30,1964).
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Barclay White Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A. 2d 336.
c)

That since the employer did not "guarantee"
indefinite employment at a stated job class,
the employees involved are entitled to unemployment compensation.

Again, no authority is cited for this novel argument
and the argument is wholly invalid. It is, of course, impossible for any employer to make such a guarantee. To
hold that the failure to make such guarantee justifies a
cessation of employment and requires the payment of unemployment compensation is so unrealistic as to be absurd.
The Senior Appeals Referee found (R. 42) :
'That the claimants in this case could have
continued in employment with the Company if they
had accepted the demotions as proposed and offered
by the Company * * *."
The Company made firm offers to these employees.
It was required to do no more. If the employees had accepted the firm offers made, they would have still been
working at the time of the hearing below in this matter
"on a job equal to or greater than the one offered them
at that time" (R. 75). However, instead, each of these employees voluntarily left his employment and hence voluntarily disqualified himself from the receipt of benefits.
d)

That the motivation of the claimants is immaterial in determining whether compensation is payable.
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The Senior Appeals Referee found that the claimants
here involved "to a considerable extent were motivated by
the fact that they thought they would be better off with
unemployment compensation, plus company supplemental
unemployment benefits, rather than continue at the reduced pay rate" (R. 44). Appellant therefore asserts at
page 22 of the brief that "what motivated the claimants
to refuse to accept work at a lesser grade in pay is immaterial". This is not true.
Under the applicable statute a claimant has the burden
of demonstrating that his unemployment was for good
cause. His specific reason for leaving the work force and
becoming unemployed certainly is material to that issue.
We submit that by admitting to a motive wholly inconsistent with the stated purpose of the statute, the claimants
disqualified themselves from any statutory benefits. In
treating the burden of a claimant under circumstances
similar to those here involved to establish "good cause" the
Pennsylvania court in Fegely V. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (1960), 192 Pa. Super. 141, 159
A. 2d 574 stated:
"The burden of proof is upon the claimant to
establish that he left his employment for a necessitous and compelling cause * * *."
"We have held that voluntary termination of
employment because of refusal to accept different
work with the same employer which is suitable and
within his capabilities does not constitute a cause
of compelling nature * * *."
«* * * Tjte compensation which the claimant would have received while temporarily assigned
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to the labor department was substantial although
lower than his previous rate of pay. Claimant had
a right to refuse the employment but it does not
follow that the change in the nature of the work
and the reduction in wages in these circumstances
placed claimant in a position whereby he could refuse with good cause and thus create a status of unemployment within the purview of the law * * *."
The claimants' motives here demonstrate conclusively
the absence of any "necessitous or compelling cause". Their
motives are material to the issues here involved and compel denial of benefits.
e)

That some theory of res judicata should bar
the Industrial Commission from denying
benefits.

Again, no authority is cited for this novel and erroneous argument. As is demonstrated from the portion of
the record quoted at pages 10-12 of appellant's brief, these
claimants have received unemployment compensation on
certain occasions in the past when they have elected to
accept lay-off status rather than demotion. On such prior
occasions, the blue slips contained no notation that the
employees involved were voluntarily leaving their employment and benefits were routinely paid. No "official protest" or "appeal" was ever taken from that action to cause
a formal determination of the issue by the Industrial Commission (R. 104).
In the instant case, each of the employees was informed prior to his being placed on lay-off status that his
refusal to accept a cut back would be placed upon his blue
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slip (R. 132). Consequently, the employee election not to
work was brought to the attention of the Industrial Commission. The issue then for the first time was thoroughly
considered and decision entered.
Since no official decision was entered in the prior situations, no doctrine of res judicata conceivably could apply. The Industrial Commission itself certainly cannot be
bound, estopped or precluded from action by res judicata
resulting from acts of administrative subordinants, never
called to its attention for its approval or rejection.
However, even assuming for purposes of argument
that the Industrial Commission itself on some prior occasion had officially ruled that these claimants were entitled
to unemployment compensation after having voluntarily
elected to be placed on lay-off status, such decision would
not constitute res judicata in this case. First there is no
showing in the record that the same factual situation prevailed. Second and more importantly, the entire doctrine
of res judicata has no application to decisions of the Commission. In Cantlay and Tanzola, Inc. V. Public Service
Commission, 120 Utah 217, 233 P. 2d 344 (1951) this court
so ruled. There a proceeding was brought by several common carriers protesting the Commission's action in granting a competitor a permit to haul petroleum products from
Salt Lake City to Vernal. The protestants there argued
that since the Commission had denied a prior application
by the applicant for a permit, the principle of res judicata
operated to bar the granting of a subsequent application.
This court stated at pages 222-23:
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"The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only
to the judicial decisions and a hearing before this
Commission does not conclude such rights of the
parties that it is deemed to be exercising a judicial
function as that term is construed in reference to
the courts."
Similarly, in Mulcahy V. Public Service Commission,
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298 (1941) this court held that
a prior decision of the Public Service Commission denying
applicant a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a common motor carrier was not res judicata as to a
subsequent application. The court said at page 254:
"The doctrine of res ad judicata applies only
to judicial decisions * * * and not to legislative, executive or ministerial determinations. ,,
The issue here involved is the proper application of
the statute. We submit that the Commission below properly interpreted the statute in this case and that its action
should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that each of the claimants
here involved voluntarily left his employment without good
cause and that each of them disqualified himself from receiving unemployment compensation benefits during the
period involved. A contrary ruling would fly directly into
the face of the stated statutory policy which precipitated
the unemployment compensation statute; it would penalize
industrious employees who choose to work, would result
in windfalls to rocking chair workers and would magnify
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the unemployment problem which it was the stated purpose
of the act to alleviate. Some of the problems inherent in
appellant's position here are described by Justice Crockett
in his concurring opinion in Olof Nelson Construction Co.,
et al. V. Industrial Commission, et al., 121 U. 525, 243 P.
2d 951 as follows:
"To permit an employee to become voluntarily
unemployed and draw benefits would have these
bad effects: It would tend to encourage work stoppage and thus bring about economic waste; and it
would put it within his power to voluntarily drain
off the Unemployment Compensation Fund and
thus hazard its soundness and the accomplishment
of its purposes."
We submit that the order of the Industrial Commission
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General.
FRED F. DREMANN,
General Counsel for the Dept.
of Employment Security,

E. V. BOORMAN,
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS,
& LATIMER.
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